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COLLATERAL DAMAGE: NON-DEBTOR RECOVERY FOR
BAD FAITH INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS
ABSTRACT
Involuntary bankruptcy is a powerful tool that creditors can use as a last
resort in attempting to collect a debt. Because this option is inherently
dangerous to undeserving debtors, the Bankruptcy Code provides for extensive
damages if creditors pursue involuntary bankruptcy in bad faith.
Unsurprisingly, this danger extends to non-debtor third parties tied to the
economic wellbeing of the debtors, but a recent circuit split creates a question
as to whether protection extends to these non-debtors as well.
While no court found that the collaterally harmed third parties had standing
under the damages provision of the Bankruptcy Code, in August 2016 the Third
Circuit split from Ninth Circuit precedent by finding that non-debtor third
parties could pursue recovery in state court. The Ninth Circuit had previously
relied on complete preemption to foreclose these opportunities.
This Comment argues the Third Circuit’s approach is moving in the right
direction and ultimately proposes a hybrid approach that attempts to solve the
flaws in both circuit decisions.
INTRODUCTION
An August 2016 decision by the Third Circuit created a circuit split on an
issue of importance for creditors contemplating filing and parties harmed by an
involuntary bankruptcy petition.1 The split concerns whether, under § 303 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”), a non-debtor third party is preempted by the
Code from pursuing a claim under state law resulting from an involuntary
bankruptcy petition filed in bad faith.2 The Third Circuit ultimately ruled in
favor of the injured non-debtor third parties, ruling against preemption.3 This
decision set the Third Circuit in conflict with the Ninth Circuit, which previously
interpreted the Code to completely preempt state law claims and prevent nondebtor third parties from having standing to pursue damages for an involuntary
bankruptcy petition filed in bad faith.4 This circuit split involves interpretive
1
2

Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC, 835 F.3d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 2016).
Compare Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419, with Miles v. Okun (In re Miles), 430 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir.

2005).
3
4

Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419.
In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083.
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differences of statutory construction, competing jurisdictional doctrines,
congressional intent, and the ultimate purpose of the Code within the realm of
involuntary bankruptcy law in the United States.5
This Comment argues that the Third Circuit’s interpretation is more
consistent with the Supreme Court’s presumption against preemption and
reduces tension within the Code created by the Ninth Circuit’s prior ruling.
Additionally, this Comment suggests a third, hybrid approach to how the courts
could interpret the Code in order to achieve the goals set forth by both Circuits.
First, this Comment explores the history, purpose, and current trends of
involuntary bankruptcy within the U.S. Bankruptcy system. There are three
central building blocks inherent in any of these situations, and thus this
Comment next provides important background information of each in turn: (1)
the relevant Code provisions; (2) the complex and often overlapping preemption
and removal doctrines; and (3) the situations in which a non-debtor third party
might be damaged in an involuntary bankruptcy filing.
This Comment then proceeds in three parts by (1) detailing the recent Third
and Ninth Circuit cases and the resulting split between them; (2) arguing that the
Third Circuit result is preferable; and (3) examining the potential impact of this
ruling on the current involuntary bankruptcy trends. Finally, this Comment
suggests a potential third option for courts to interpret the Code in these
situations and concludes with a call to Congress to clarify its intent.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. History and Purpose of Involuntary Bankruptcy
Involuntary bankruptcy, as its name suggests, is a tool that creditors can use
to force unwilling debtors into a chapter 7 or chapter 11 bankruptcy.6 The
concept has existed since bankruptcy laws were first enacted in 16th century
England.7 In fact, involuntary bankruptcy was the only type of bankruptcy
available in the United States until the United States Bankruptcy Act of 1841.8
The dominant purpose of the original bankruptcy system was to help creditors
collect debts, not to aid debtors in finding relief from creditors, and as such only

5

See Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419; In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1094.
11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016).
7
Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 5, 7–8 (1995).
8
Id. at 11, 14 & 17.
6
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creditors could commence the bankruptcy proceeding.9 Bankruptcy was thus
premised only on “debtor misconduct” and involuntary bankruptcy continued its
reliance on this concept all the way until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,10
at which point bankruptcy policy began to shift from debtor misconduct to
debtor relief. As this Comment discusses below, the broad theme of bankruptcy
law in the United States has shifted almost completely to the other side of the
pendulum, but the tension between the competing objectives still exists today
and permeates through the Code and case law.11
Thus, the purpose of involuntary bankruptcy in the current Code system is
still to provide creditors with a tool to “compel a reorganization or liquidation
of the debtor’s estate.”12 This tool is especially useful if the creditor suspects the
debtor is wasting or concealing assets, or to prevent other creditors from seizing
the debtor’s property.13 However, Congress has recognized this tool inherently
opens the door for creditor abuse and thus included significant debtor protection
provisions in the Code as well.
1. Trends in Involuntary Bankruptcy
In order to examine when a creditor might be liable for a dismissed
involuntary bankruptcy petition, it is important to first briefly inspect when,
why, and how often creditors pursue this path. This section highlights the trends
in involuntary bankruptcy law in the U.S. as well as reasons why creditors might
not be choosing this option for collecting on a debt.
Despite the prevalence of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings in the early
stages of bankruptcy law and Congress’ continued support of their use, in
modern history, the number of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings filed each
year is surprisingly low, both in total and in comparison to the number of
voluntary bankruptcy cases filed each year, as seen in Figure 1 below.

9

Tabb, supra note 7, at 8.
Id.
11
See Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, Involuntary Petitions under the New Bankruptcy Code,
97 BANKING L.J. 292, 328 (1980).
12
Id.
13
Joseph G. Rosania, Involuntary Petitions under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 13 COLO. LAW.
1367, 1368 (1984).
10
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Year
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015

Total Bankruptcies
194,399
254,484
210,364
364,536
749,981
883,457
1,262,102
1,782,643
1,596,355
860,182

Total Involuntary
1,099
1,286
936
1,597
1,637
1,142
730
563
1,054
351

[Vol. 35

% Involuntary
0.57%
0.51%
0.44%
0.44%
0.22%
0.13%
0.06%
0.03%
0.07%
0.04%

Figure 1: Involuntary Bankruptcy Cases Filed by Year14
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 in part to encourage
involuntary bankruptcies by relaxing the standard that creditors must prove to
successfully place a debtor into involuntary bankruptcy.15 Notwithstanding these
efforts, involuntary bankruptcies have remained few and continued to decline.16
The significant risks a creditor faces when filing an involuntary bankruptcy,
14
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts―Voluntary and Involuntary Cases Filed, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/Table7.02.pdf.
15
Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why the Number Is Not Too
Small, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 803, 804 (1991).
16
Id.
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combined with the variety of alternative options for collecting on a debt, have
left involuntary bankruptcies as a last resort, a view supported by the bankruptcy
courts.17
It is important to note, however, that “these statistics do not present a clear
picture of the extent to which debtors are coerced into bankruptcy. The line
between voluntary and involuntary filings is an ambiguous one because debtors
often file voluntary petitions in reaction to creditors’ collection efforts.”18
Elizabeth Warren accentuates this by stating “[a] very real issue-and one often
ignored-is whether the barriers to involuntary filings discourage too many
creditors who should force a defaulting creditor into the bankruptcy process.”19
If Congress were to takes steps to combat these overly coerced voluntary
bankruptcies, involuntary bankruptcy could see increased usage and
significance.
Overall, involuntary bankruptcies are likely here to stay, even as an
infrequently used last resort.20 Despite the seemingly inconsequential number of
involuntary bankruptcies relative to the entire bankruptcy scheme, this process
remains an important aspect of both the Code and creditor collection options and
thus warrants continued analysis.
2. Requirements For Filing an Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition Under
§ 303
Involuntary bankruptcy cases are governed by § 303 of the Code, which sets
forth the requirements for a creditor to be able to file an involuntary bankruptcy
petition.21 As previously mentioned, creditors may initiate involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings under either chapter 7 or chapter 11. 22 However, there
17
See Higgins v. Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 379 F.3d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Capital Fin., Inc.,
No. BAP CC-07-1122-BAKPA, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4913, at *1 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2007); In re Meltzer,
516 B.R. 504, 515 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).
18
Block-Lieb, supra note 15.
19
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 798 (1987).
20
Block-Lieb, supra note 15.
21
11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016).
22
In chapter 11 bankruptcy, debts are not liquidated but restructured such that debt repayment is possible.
The debtor maintains possession of its assets in chapter 11. In chapter 7 bankruptcy assets are sold and liquidated
to repay as much of the debt as possible. Much of the remaining debt is discharged (forgiven). Chapter 11
bankruptcy is more common in situations involving corporations and other businesses, and chapter 7 bankruptcy
is more commonly used by individuals; “Involuntary chapter 13 cases are not permitted…To do so would
constitute bad policy, because chapter 13 only works when there is a willing debtor that wants to repay his
creditors. Short of involuntary servitude, it is difficult to keep a debtor working for his creditors when he does
not want to pay them back.” S. REP. 95-989, at 32 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5818; 2
NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3d § 22:1 (3rd ed. 2018); 11 U.S.C. § 303(a).

WEBSTER COMMENT_PROOFS

116

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

1/15/2019 10:50 AM

[Vol. 35

are more than five times as many chapter 7 involuntary bankruptcy petitions as
chapter 11.23 This reflects the fact that involuntary bankruptcy proceedings do
not usually occur until it is too late for an optimistic outlook towards
restructuring and reorganization of the debtor—the goals of chapter 11—and the
creditor is hoping to recover whatever it can through the liquidation that results
from a chapter 11 case.24 This highlights the recurring theme in involuntary
bankruptcy that creditors must balance the risks of forcing debtors into
bankruptcy and the potential serious penalties, if incorrect, against their goal of
recovering at least some of the debt.
Under either chapter there are several requirements that must be met for a
debtor to be eligible for an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.25 First, the
aggregate amount of eligible unsecured claims held by the debtors must be at
least $15,775.26 If the debtor has twelve or more creditors, then at least three of
the creditors must participate in the filing.27 If there are fewer than twelve
creditors, only one creditor must file for the petition to qualify.28 Finally, a claim
is only considered eligible for involuntary bankruptcy if there is no legitimate
reason that the debtor has not paid the debt, and thus the court disqualifies claims
that are (1) contingent as to a liability, or (2) subject to a dispute.29
Once the creditor(s) petition the bankruptcy court, the debtor can only
defend against being forced into bankruptcy by filing an answer to the petition.30
Once the creditor petition meets the various administrative requirements,
including on time filing and satisfying the above thresholds for the dollar amount
of claims and number of creditors, the court will review the case.31 The court
will rule against the debtor and thus put them into involuntary bankruptcy only
if (1) the debtor is “generally not paying such debtors’ debts as such debts
become due;”32 or (2) a custodian has been appointed or taken possession of all
23
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts―Voluntary and Involuntary Cases Filed, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/Table7.02.pdf.
24
Block-Lieb, supra note 15, at 850.
25
11 U.S.C. § 303.
26
11 U.S.C. § 303(b).
27
11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2).
28
11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1).
29
Id.
30
11 U.S.C. § 303(d).
31
Id.
32
See 2 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC, supra note 22 (“To establish that a debtor is not paying its debts as
they become due, a petitioning creditor must do more than establish that the debtor has unpaid creditors or
creditors whose obligations carry no fixed dates; petitioners must, in fact, outline the regular payment terms for
the debts and then show that the debts are overdue according to those terms.4 Furthermore, it must be shown
that the debtor’s delinquency is germane. Courts have used four factors in making this determination: (1) the

WEBSTER COMMENT_PROOFS

2019]

1/15/2019 10:50 AM

COLLATERAL DAMAGE

117

or substantially all of the debtor’s assets within 120 days before the filing date
of creditor petition.33
3. Damages Awarded for Dismissed Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition
Under § 303(i)
Courts carefully scrutinize involuntary bankruptcy decisions because “the
filing of an involuntary petition is an extreme remedy with serious consequences
to the alleged debtor, such as loss of credit standing, inability to transfer assets
and carry on business affairs, and public embarrassment,” regardless of whether
the petitions ends up heard or dismissed.34 The courts are also wary of becoming
overburdened if seen as a common tool for collecting any debts:
An allegation of bankruptcy is a charge that ought not to be made
lightly. It usually chills the alleged debtor’s credit and his sources of
supply. It can scare away his customers. It leaves a permanent scar,
even if promptly dismissed. It is also obvious that the use of the
bankruptcy court as a routine collection device would quickly paralyze
this court.35

Because the courts view involuntary petitions as a last resort remedy for
creditors that has severe ramifications for the debtor, the Code sets forth serious
consequences for creditors who file an involuntary bankruptcy petition that ends
up being dismissed.36 Section 303(i) establishes that:
(i) If the court dismisses a petition under this section other than on
consent of all petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive
the right to judgment under this subsection, the court may grant
judgment—
(1) against the petitioners and in favor of the debtor for—
(A) costs; or
(B) a reasonable attorney’s fee; or
(2) against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad faith, for—
(A) any damages proximately caused by such filing; or
(B) punitive damages.37

number of unpaid claims; (2) the amount of such claims; (3) the materiality of the nonpayment; and (4) the
debtor’s overall conduct of its financial affairs.”).
33
11 U.S.C. § 303(d).
34
In re Reid, 773 F.2d 945, 946 (7th Cir. 1985).
35
In re SBA Factors of Miami, Inc., 13 B.R. 99, 101 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
36
11 U.S.C. § 303(i).
37
11 U.S.C. § 303(i).
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By holding creditors accountable for costs, attorney’s fees, and even
compensatory and punitive damages if the involuntary bankruptcy proceeding is
dismissed in bad faith, Congress has firmly expressed its view that involuntary
bankruptcies should not be taken lightly when a creditor evaluates its options for
collecting a debt.38 This is a primary reason why involuntary bankruptcies are
becoming increasingly rare,39 and it is a reflection of how far the U.S.
bankruptcy system has shifted from helping creditors collect to protecting
debtors from collection.
As discussed in more detail below, § 303(i)(1) of the Code expressly
reserves awards for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees for only the debtor.40
The circuit split and this Comment focus on the rights of non-debtors whose
potential claim would only arise under § 303(i)(2). Section 303(i)(2) provides
for compensatory and punitive damages if the involuntary bankruptcy petition
is filed in bad faith.41 Thus, it is important to examine how a court determines
what constitutes “bad faith” with respect to involuntary bankruptcy petitions.
First, “there is a presumption of good faith in favor of the petitioning
creditor, and thus the alleged debtor has the burden of proving bad faith.”42
Additionally, “this burden is a significant one” as the debtor “must prove bad
faith by at least a preponderance of the evidence.”43 This high burden makes
sense considering the harsh penalties the creditor faces if this burden is met.
Because “the determination of bad faith is a fact intensive determination” and
the standard for defining bad faith is not defined in the Code, “courts have
applied a dizzying array of standards.”44
Recently, the Third Circuit illustrated this dizzying array of standards,
calling it a “totality of the circumstances” standard of review.45 It stated that
courts may consider a number of factors, including, but not limited to,
whether: (1) the creditors satisfied the statutory criteria for filing the
petition; (2) the involuntary petition was meritorious; (3) the creditors
made a reasonable inquiry into the relevant facts and pertinent law
before filing; (4) there was evidence of preferential payments to certain

38

In re Reid, 773 F.2d at 946.
Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982
WIS. L. REV. 311, 353 (1982).
40
11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1).
41
11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2).
42
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. DJF Realty & Suppliers, Inc., 58 B.R. 1008, 1011 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
43
In re CLE Corp., 59 B.R. 579, 583 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).
44
In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 335 (3d Cir. 2015).
45
Id.
39
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creditors or of dissipation of the debtor’s assets; (5) the filing was
motivated by ill will or a desire to harass; (6) the petitioning creditors
used the filing to obtain a disproportionate advantage for themselves
rather than to protect against other creditors doing the same; (7) the
filing was used as a tactical advantage in pending actions; (8) the filing
was used as a substitute for customary debt-collection procedures; and
(9) the filing had suspicious timing.46

Therefore, unsurprisingly, the court will employ a case-by-case analysis to
determine whether a petitioning creditor acted in bad faith,47 and if it finds that
such creditors acted in bad faith, the compensatory and punitive damages
awarded are often severe.48 For example, in In re Forever Green Athletic Fields,
Inc., the Third Circuit used a combination of the third, seventh, eighth, and ninth
factors to determine that the creditor filed the petition in bad faith.49 In Forever
Green, the creditor had a pending judgment against the debtor which it could
have used to satisfy payments owed to the creditor. However, the creditor in
Forever Green filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition that was “light on
meritorious arguments,” had suspicious timing, and was clearly being used as a
tactical advantage in pending actions to get an advantage over other creditors
and “to gain a personal advantage in other pending actions or as a debt-collection
service.”50 The court concluded that this did in fact constitute a bad faith
involuntary bankruptcy petition.51
B. Preemption and Removal Jurisdiction Doctrine
In addition to the specific Code sections governing involuntary bankruptcies,
preemption and removal play an important role within bankruptcy law in general
and in the involuntary bankruptcy context. While the Code is federal law,
bankruptcy almost always involves issues of contract law, over which state law
46

In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d at 336.
See Block-Lieb, supra note 15, at 842 (“There is no single definition of bad faith for purposes of section
303(i). Some courts emphasize petitioners’ desires to harass, embarrass or harm the debtor as indicative of bad
faith.” Others have found bad faith in the petitioning creditors’ [attempts] to use bankruptcy as a substitute for
their state collection remedies. Collusive behavior has also often been held to constitute bad faith. That one or
more creditors solicited others to join in the involuntary petition is not alone indicative of collusion or bad faith.
Although one court was persuaded that a petitioning creditor did not act in bad faith when it relied on erroneous
legal advice, several others have found that the petitioners’ reliance on legal advice is not dispositive of their
good faith.”).
48
In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., L.L.C., 439 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that the bankruptcy
court did not err in awarding costs, attorney’s fees, compensatory damages, and punitive damages totaling $6.4
million pursuant to § 303(i) based on bad-faith filing of involuntary petition.).
49
In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d at 336.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 338.
47
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typically governs.52 Thus, it is unsurprising that these often overlap, compete,
and sometimes clash and consequently invoke the very essence of preemption.
In addition to the substantive issues involved in the case, the forum in which
these issues are litigated and decided also often intersect.53 This leads to
additional issues related to removal of bankruptcy related proceedings from state
to federal courts.
These federalism issues—preemption and removal—are central to the theme
of this Comment and the fulcrum of the circuit split, and as such the Comment
next provides an overview of federal preemption and removal jurisdiction.
1. Federal Preemption
Established by the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,54 the Supreme
Court has “long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are
without effect.”55 Preemption embodies the Founders’ separation of powers
concerns in drafting the Constitution as a doctrine that is a “necessary but
precarious component of our system of federalism under which the states and
the federal government possess concurrent sovereignty.”56 The Supreme Court
requires that any preemption analysis “must be guided by two cornerstones of
our preemption jurisprudence.”57 These two cornerstones are (1) “the purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case;” and (2) “in all
preemption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated …
we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.” 58 In other words, in every preemption case the courts are
required to (1) look first and foremost to Congress’ intent to supersede the state
law; and (2) unless such congressional intent is “clear and manifest,” examine
the case with a “presumption against preemption.”59 With this framework in
mind, the court has demonstrated that there are two overarching types of federal
preemption: complete and ordinary.60 While both deal with situations in which
federal law supersedes state law, there are multiple differences between them.

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 49 (1979).
See Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1987).
U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.
Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008).
Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 687 (3d Cir. 2016).
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565.
Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2005).
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2. Ordinary Preemption
Much more common than complete preemption, ordinary preemption is
known as “defensive preemption” because it is a tool that defendants can use to
prove in a state law action that “because federal law preempts state law, the
defendant cannot be held liable under state law.”61 Ordinary preemption doctrine
provides that after a plaintiff files suit in state court under a state law cause of
action, one of the defendant’s defenses may be that the state law at issue in the
case is preempted by federal law, and thus the plaintiff’s complaint cannot be
successful.62 As will become evident in the next section, it is important to note
that this defensive preemption serves only as a defense in the state court trial,
not as justification for federal subject matter jurisdiction and thus a removal of
the case to federal courts.63
The Supreme Court has found that “ordinary defensive preemption comes in
three familiar forms: express preemption, conflict preemption, and field
preemption.”64
(1) Congress’ intent may be explicitly stated in the statute’s language
or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. In the absence of
an express congressional command, (2) state law is pre-empted if that
law actually conflicts with federal law, or (3) if federal law so
thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.65

Field preemption is at the heart of the circuit split discussed below. Field
preemption occurs when “an Act of Congress touches a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”66 As discussed above, field
preemption, as with all the other preemption doctrines, requires that
“congressional intent to supersede state laws must be clear and manifest.”67

61

Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 272–73.
See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Blab T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable
Commc’ns, Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 855 (11th Cir. 1999); Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th
Cir. 2003).
63
See Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 393.
64
Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 273.
65
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted); Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S.
1, 14 (1983) (“[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal
defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and
even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.”).
66
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
67
Id.
62
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3. Complete Preemption
The other type of preemption is complete preemption. Despite its name,
complete preemption is “less a principle of substantive preemption than it is a
rule of federal jurisdiction,”68 and at its core is an exception to the well pleaded
complaint rule for removal to federal court.69 The well pleaded complaint rule is
a procedural rule stating that federal jurisdiction does not apply to a case unless
the plaintiff’s complaint asserts on its face an issue of federal law.
Consequentially, the only way a federal question is litigated in federal court is if
the plaintiff brings up the federal issue. Thus, within the preemption context,
unless the plaintiff’s claim mentions federal law, a defendant cannot remove the
case based on a defense of ordinary federal preemption. This has been made
particularly clear by the Supreme Court, stating that “a case may not be removed
to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of
preemption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and
even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at
issue.”70
Complete preemption exists as an exception to this rule. While it remains a
rare, “troublesome and confusing” doctrine,71 “[u]nder the complete-preemption
doctrine, certain federal statutes are construed to have such ‘extraordinary’
preemptive force that state-law claims coming within the scope of the federal
statute are transformed, for jurisdictional purposes, into federal claims.”72
Because “preemption and jurisdiction are . . . inexorably intertwined,”73 this
doctrine allows for cases to be removed to federal courts even if the plaintiff did
not assert the federal issue in their complaint and the claims are decided under
federal law. Complete preemption alone grants both removal and preemption all
at once. The Supreme Court has only extended complete preemption to three
statutes: (1) § 301 of the Labor and Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29
U.S.C. § 185;74 (2) § 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of

68
69
70
71

Blab T.V. of Mobile, Inc, 182 F.3d at 855.
Id.; In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1094.
Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 393.
Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 21 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); In re Miles, 430 F.3d

at 1094.
72
73
74

Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 272.
MSR Expl., Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 912 (9th Cir. 1996).
See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
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1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132;75 and (3) § 85 and § 86 of the National Bank
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86.76
4. Comparing and Distinguishing Field And Complete Preemption
The line between field and complete preemption is both narrow and
complicated and continues to evolve. While they do “serve distinct purposes”77
and “must be distinguished,”78 they are also so similar their analyses have even
led to “some courts’ confusion of field preemption with the complete preemption
doctrine,79 “occasionally . . . equat[ing] complete preemption to field
preemption,”80 or describing complete preemption as a “subspecies of field
preemption.”81 The confusion permeates throughout multiple circuit courts.82
As previously mentioned, their primary difference is that complete
preemption is at its core a jurisdictional doctrine used to remove a case to federal
court while field preemption is used to decide a case, usually by state court
justices applying the preemptive federal law. Complete preemption “applies
only where Congress creates an exclusive federal cause of action,”83 while the
field preemption tests whether “Congress intended to foreclose any state
regulation.”84 This means that in complete preemption, Congress enacts
legislation that not only completely supersedes, or preempts, any state law on
the subject, but also can only be litigated in federal courts. Field preemption only
accomplishes the former objective of preempting any state law on the issue.

75

See Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).
See Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. 1. For a detailed explanation of these three cases and how the
relate to bankruptcy; see also Oleksandra Johnson, The Bankruptcy Code as Complete Preemption: The Ultimate
Trump?, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 31, 64 (2007).
77
Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 948 (9th Cir. 2014).
78
Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 272.
79
S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 747
(1991).
80
Retail Prop. Tr., 768 F.3d at 948.
81
Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 790 F.3d 1088, 1097 (10th Cir. 2015).
82
See e.g., Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 272; Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102,
1107 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000); SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525, 530 n. 4 (1st Cir. 2007); In re NOS Commc’ns,
495 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003); ARCO Envtl.
Remediation, 213 F.3d at 1114; Johnson v. MFA Petroleum Co., 701 F.3d 243, 254 (8th Cir. 2012) (Beam, J.,
dissenting); Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 417 (7th Cir. 2002); Lehmann v. Brown, 230 F.3d 916, 919
(7th Cir. 2000).
83
Carter v. Cent. Reg’l W. Va. Airport Auth., Triad Eng’g, Inc., Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-13155, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96523, at *38 (S.D. W. Va. July 25, 2016).
84
Id. at *44.
76
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Likely unsurprising at this point, however, both doctrines “bear a number of
similarities” and “rest on the breadth . . . of a federal statute’s preemptive
force.”85 As such, and most important for the analysis in this Comment, the line
between them is sufficiently narrow that the analysis of one would very likely
lead to the same result as the analysis of the other.86 If the relevant evidence does
not demonstrate clear and manifest congressional intent to “regulate the entire
field,”87 neither field nor complete preemption is likely to apply. Figure 2
provides a diagram demonstrating how field and complete preemption fit into
the larger preemption doctrine.

Figure 2: Federal Preemption Doctrine

85
86
87

Retail Prop. Tr., 768 F.3d at 948.
See generally Rosenberg, 835 F.3d 414.
ARCO Envtl. Remediation, L.L.C., 213 F.3d 1108.
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5. Removal Jurisdiction
Because complete preemption is at its core a jurisdictional doctrine used as
a basis for removal, it is also important to provide a brief background of removal
jurisdiction in the bankruptcy context. Bankruptcy courts have existed in their
present form, a separate federal court in each federal district, since the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.88 The scope of their jurisdictional power has
undergone both expansion and narrowing through the actions of both Congress
and Supreme Court.89 Section 1334 of title 28 governs federal courts’
jurisdiction of bankruptcy cases:
[C]urrently district courts ‘have original and exclusive
jurisdiction of all cases under title 11,’ and ‘original but not
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title
11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.’90
The federal district court may then refer the case to bankruptcy courts. The
complex analysis to determine what makes a case “under” versus “arising under”
or “arising in related to cases under” title 11 is beyond the scope of this
Comment, as is the type of proceedings bankruptcy courts can receive from
federal courts.91 However, once a case is in state court, removal of claims related
to bankruptcy cases is governed by both § 1441 (the “general federal removal
statute”) and § 1452 (the “bankruptcy removal statute”) of title 28 of the United
States Code.92 Section 1452 provides:
§ 1452. Removal of claims related to bankruptcy cases
(a) A party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action
other than a proceeding before the United States Tax Court or a civil
action by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s
police or regulatory power, to the district court for the district where
such civil action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction of
such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title.93
Thus, a claim within the “original and exclusive jurisdiction … under
title 11” as set forth in section 1334 may be removed by any party pursuant

88
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, amended by Pub. L. No. 109-08,
119 Stat. 23 (effective as to cases filed on or after Oct. 17, 2005, with certain specified exceptions) (codified at
11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1532)(2016).
89
For a summary of this evolution, see Johnson, supra note 76.
90
Johnson, supra note 76, at 46.
91
Johnson, supra note 76.
92
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 126 (1995).
93
28 U.S.C. § 1452 (2016).
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to section 1452.94 This works similarly to the jurisdiction aspect of complete
preemption: even if the plaintiff only brings a state law claim, if the court
finds the case to meet the statutory bankruptcy jurisdictional requirements the
defendant can remove the case based on federal question jurisdiction.95

To summarize, preemption doctrine determines whether federal or state law
applies to an issue in a case and removal doctrine dictates whether the issue is
litigated in federal or state court. Complete preemption at once answers both
questions—law and forum—with the federal system.
C. Non-Debtor Third Party in Involuntary Bankruptcy
Finally, in addition to the relevant Code provisions, preemption and
jurisdictional doctrines, the issue in these cases and this Comment rests on the
rights of non-debtor third parties. While nothing in the Code or its legislative
history discusses non-debtors or their potential remedies within the involuntary
bankruptcy arena, it is quite intuitive that non-debtors could be proximately or
derivatively damaged from a bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petition. For the
debtor, involuntary bankruptcy “chills the alleged debtor’s credit and his sources
of supply. It can scare away his customers. It leaves a permanent scar, even if
promptly dismissed.”96 Despite potentially abandoning the debtor, these
hypothetical creditors, suppliers, and customers of the debtor are not immune
from collateral damage caused by the involuntary bankruptcy petition. Courts
have recognized that “it is important here to note that the harm from an improper
involuntary bankruptcy petition can result not only to the debtor but also to the
debtor’s owners, employees, suppliers, customers and other creditors.”97 This is
especially true with the vast majority of involuntary bankruptcies initiated under
chapter 7, where third parties would be forced to prepare for the complete
liquidation of the debtor.98
For example, consider how an involuntary bankruptcy petition, filed against
a manufacturer, could affect one of the manufacturer’s suppliers. The supplier’s
revenue, cash flow, and credit might be tied to the expectation of sales to the
manufacturer. It is no stretch to imagine that the supplier’s finances, whether
through its stock price or creditworthiness, will likely deteriorate under fear of
the lost revenue. This logic applies to large corporations within a global,
94

Johnson, supra note 76, at 46.
Johnson, supra note 76.
96
In re SBA Factors of Miami, Inc., 13 B.R. at 101.
97
In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., L.L.C., 298 B.R. at 605.
98
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts―Voluntary and Involuntary Cases Filed, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code.
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/Table7.02.pdf.
95
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complex supply chain to small business owners to individual consumers. In an
increasingly technological and connected society, news of such a petition will
travel faster than ever before with potentially far reaching ramifications.
These proximate or derivative damages also might apply to other creditors
of the debtor.99 Interest on credit can be a significant portion of creditor revenue,
and much like the example above, the threat of potential liquidation might also
impact other creditors’ well-being. Overall, it is easy to imagine involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings as having an increasingly negative impact on nondebtors in the current environment.
II. EXAMINING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
With the Code, preemption and removal doctrines, and non-debtors’ roles in
mind, this section will proceed in three parts. First, this section examines the
cases and their subsequent circuit split between the Ninth and Third Circuits.
This section next argues that the Third Circuit’s analysis is preferable. Finally,
this section examines the potential impact of the Rosenberg decision and the
resulting split.
A. Analytical Structure
Each of the case analyses follows the same structure used by the courts: (1)
preemption and (2) standing. The courts employ this construction because in
these situations there are two distinct ways in which the non-debtors could
recover damages for the dismissed involuntary bankruptcy proceeding: (1) under
state law causes of action; or (2) under § 303 of the Code. First, and why
preemption doctrine is essential to this issue, in order to recover under state law
the court must find that the federal Code does not preempt such state action. If
state law is preempted by the Code, the only remaining avenue for recovery
requires the court to determine that § 303(i)(2) gives standing to non-debtors.
1. In re Miles
In the Ninth Circuit case In re Miles, the defendants filed ten involuntary
bankruptcy petitions against Rodney Miles, Ann Miles, and the businesses the
Miles affiliated with or owned, all resulting from a neighborly feud.100 After the
bankruptcy court dismissed all of the petitions, nine of them on grounds
including bad faith, Ann Miles and the couple’s daughters “filed three
99
100

In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., L.L.C., 298 B.R. at 605.
In re Miles, 294 B.R. at 758, aff’d, 430 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005).
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substantially identical tort actions in a California state court seeking damages
for the filing and prosecution of the involuntary petitions.”101 The complaints
stated theories of defamation, false light, abuse of process, emotional distress,
negligent misrepresentation, and simple negligence.102 The bankruptcy court,
Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, and Ninth Circuit all ruled that (1)
the state law tort claims were completely preempted by § 303(i) of the Code;
and (2) the Miles’ did not have standing to pursue damages for bad faith
involuntary bankruptcy petitions under § 303(i)(2).103 This Comment next
explores both of these holdings in turn.
a. Preemption
By finding for complete preemption, the court in In re Miles achieved the
two goals inherent in the complete preemption doctrine: (1) jurisdictionally, the
case was properly removed from state court to federal bankruptcy court; and (2)
the Code preempts any state law action related to non-debtor third party damages
in the bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petition context.104 As discussed above,
the complete preemption doctrine serves as a powerful exception to the wellpleaded-complaint rule and allows for both appropriate removal and
“transform[s] the plaintiff’s state-law claims into federal claims.”105
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that complete preemption remains rare and
that the U.S. Supreme Court has only applied complete preemption to specific
provisions of three federal statutes, none of which include the Code.106
Nevertheless, after concluding that the Code and its legislative history are silent
on the matter, the court looks to the “structure and purpose” of the Code to
determine if Congress intended § 303(i) “to provide the exclusive cause of action
for damages resulting from the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition.”107
The court employed a four step analysis set forth in a prior Ninth Circuit case to
conclude that complete preemption applies in this case: (1) “Congress’
placement of bankruptcy jurisdiction exclusively in the federal district court”;
(2) the complex and comprehensive nature of the Code; (3) the Constitutional
“power to Congress ‘to establish…uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies

101
102
103
104
105
106
107

In re Miles, 294 B.R. at 758.
Id. at 759.
In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (1998).
In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1085.
Id.
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throughout the United States’”; and (4) extensive remedies for improper conduct
already provided for by the Code.108
The court applies this logic and thus rules that by “[p]ermitting state courts
to decide whether the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition was
appropriate would . . . undermine uniformity in bankruptcy law by allowing state
courts to create their own standards as to when a creditor may properly file an
involuntary petition.”109 Finally, while the court states that it does “not hold that
all state actions related to bankruptcy proceedings are subject to the complete
preemption doctrine,” it reaches its decision on the premise that the Code is “far
from silent” with respect to remedies and sanctions for behavior in the
bankruptcy court.110 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that “§ 303(i) provides
the exclusive cause of action for damages predicated upon the filing of an
involuntary bankruptcy petition” and complete preemption must apply.111
b. Standing
Once the court ruled that the Miles’ state law claims were completely
preempted by § 303(i) of the Code, the complaints were “recharacterized as
alleging damages claims under § 303(i)” because “[c]omplete preemption
recharacterizes a complaint with state law claims into one arising under federal
law.”112 Thus, the court had to then examine whether the Miles’ had standing to
pursue damages under § 303(i)(2).113
The Ninth Circuit first examined the text of the Code.114 The Code permits
the court to grant judgment “against the petitioners and in favor of the debtor”
under § 303(i)(1)115 and “against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad
faith”116 under § 303(i)(2).117 The court found that there are two possible
readings for “mentioning only the debtor and the petitioning creditors in
§ 303(i)(1)” but omitting the words “and in favor of the debtor” in § 303(i)(2):
(1) Congress intended to limit the debtor’s standing; or (2) Congress intended to
allow standing for non-debtors if the involuntary petition was filed in bad
108

In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1085.
Id.
110
Id. at 1088.
111
In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005).
112
In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1093 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953,
958 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotes omitted).
113
In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005).
114
In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005).
115
11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1) (2016) (emphasis added).
116
11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2) (2016) (emphasis added).
117
11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2016) (emphasis added).
109
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faith.118 In finding multiple potential interpretations, the court stated that the
language is ambiguous and thus the court must consider “legislative history,
relevant case law, and public policy to resolve the question.”119
Thus, the court extracted the relevant 1977 House and Senate Reports,
adding emphasis to “debtor” to interpret congressional intent limiting damages
from bad faith involuntary bankruptcy filings:
[I]f a petitioning creditor filed the petition in bad faith, the court may
award the debtor any damages proximately caused by the filing of the
petition. These damages may include such items as loss of business
during and after the pendency of the case, and so on.120

The court finished its ruling by returning to a textual analysis in examining
the introductory clause to § 303(i) that grants “the debtor” the ability to “waive
the right to judgment under this subsection:”121
(i) If the court dismisses a petition under this section other than on consent
of all petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive the right
to judgment under this subsection, the court may grant judgment—
(2) against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad faith, for—
(A) any damages proximately caused by such filing; or
(B) punitive damages.122
The court read this provision such that “allowing third parties to seek damages
could invite abuse of the system” because debtors could extort petitioning
creditors or non-debtors seeking damages into paying for waiver or non-waiver
by the debtor.123 Therefore, because Congress “took great care” in drafting the
Code such that it would prevent abuse of the bankruptcy process, Congress could
not have intended this provision to apply to non-debtor third parties.124
c. Judge Berzon’s Concurrence
In his concurrence, Judge Berzon relied on other Ninth Circuit precedent to
argue for a simpler approach: any action that collaterally attacks a bankruptcy
petition are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the federal courts, and
118

In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1094.
Id.
120
H.R.Rep. No. 95–595, at 324 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6280 (emphasis added);
S.Rep. No. 95–989, at 34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5820 (identical text).
121
11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2016).
122
Id. (emphasis added).
123
In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005).
124
Id.
119

WEBSTER COMMENT_PROOFS

2019]

1/15/2019 10:50 AM

COLLATERAL DAMAGE

131

thus the state court in such a situation has no power to hear the case.125 Judge
Berzon agreed that “state law claims in the present case are preempted because
state law cannot add to the remedial scheme Congress created under the
Bankruptcy Code” but also found that the majority holding “would to a degree
swallow the well-pleaded complaint rule, by permitting removal to federal court
in any circumstance in which federal law provides someone a cause of action
and also precludes state law causes of action.”126 He summarized his argument:
In short, there is removal jurisdiction under the exclusive jurisdiction
rationale . . . I see no reason to expand the troublesome and confusing
doctrine of complete preemption . . . as there is another, simpler ground
for reaching the same result. I therefore would not reach the question
of whether there is complete preemption in this case.127

Judge Berzon essentially disagreed with the jurisdictional reasoning “in the
choice-of-law sense” for removal to the federal courts.128 Judge Berzon’s
argument reached the same result with a different line of reasoning: (1) the filing
of involuntary bankruptcy petitions is clearly a “case under title 11” and subject
to exclusive original jurisdiction of the federal court and sufficient to deem the
removal proper;129 (2) the state law action is preempted by ordinary field
preemption, not complete;130 and finally, (3) agreeing that the non-debtors do
not have standing under the preemptive Bankruptcy Code.131 It is important here
to note that the Miles court could have reached their exact same conclusion
without invoking the troublesome and confusing complete preemption
doctrine.132
2. Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC
In Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC, the Third Circuit split from the
Ninth Circuit’s complete preemption ruling in Miles with respect to non-debtor
125
In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1095–96 (Berzon, J., concurring) (“Gonzales v. Parks held that all actions,
such as the present one, that collaterally attack bankruptcy petitions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). See 830 F.2d at 1035 n.6 (stating that ‘[f]ilings of bankruptcy petitions
are a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction and that ‘[s]tate courts are not authorized to determine whether a
person’s claim for relief under a federal law, in a federal court, and within that court’s exclusive jurisdiction, is
an appropriate one’ because ‘[s]uch an exercise of authority would be inconsistent with and subvert the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts’”)).
126
In re Miles, 430 F.3d 1095–96 (Berzon, J., concurring).
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
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third parties pursuing state law damages for bad faith filings.133 A “fragment of
more than a decade of ongoing litigation”, the appeal in Rosenberg involved a
similar fact pattern to Miles.134 To finance the purchase of medical imaging
equipment, Maury Rosenberg (the plaintiff’s husband) entered into leases with
DVI. During litigation in state court over money Rosenberg owed under the
leases, DVI Receivables filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions against
Rosenberg.135 After multiple suits and appeals, Rosenberg eventually won an
action under § 303(i) against DVI Receivables in which he was awarded $1.1
million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages under
§ 303(i)(2) for the bad faith filing by DVI receivables.136 Non-debtor third
parties aside, these high amounts awarded to the debtor demonstrate just how
seriously the bankruptcy system punishes bad faith involuntary bankruptcy
petitioners.
Subsequently, Rosenberg’s wife Sara, along with several Rosenberg
businesses entities, “brought suit to recover damages stemming from the
involuntary bankruptcy petitions filed against Maury Rosenberg” under a
“single claim of tortious interference with contracts and relationships.”137 The
complaint alleged that DVI Receivables filed the involuntary bankruptcy
petitions to force Rosenberg’s real estate company to default on underlying
mortgages, which ultimately happened.138 The district court ruled to dismiss,
finding that the “state law tortious interference claim was preempted by the
involuntary bankruptcy provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”139 On appeal, and
similar to the Ninth Circuit in Miles, the Third Circuit considered both standing
and preemption. The Third Circuit “agree[d] with the Miles Court that nondebtors lack standing under § 303(i) to recover damages.”140 The court did not
provide any additional analysis on this point. However, the Third Circuit
rejected Miles by holding that “Bankruptcy Code § 303(i) does not preempt state
law claims by non-debtors for damages based on the filing of an involuntary
bankruptcy petition.”141

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419.
Id. at 416.
Id.
Id. at 417.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 416.
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a. Preemption
The Rosenberg court performed its preemption analysis through the lens of
field preemption instead of complete preemption. However, it points out that
while “complete preemption is not the same as field preemption . . . finding
complete preemption in the context § 303(i) would also support finding field
preemption in our case.”142 Because field preemption and complete preemption
are so similar with respect to substantive preemption issues, and, if anything,
complete preemption requires more on the preemption spectrum; the court
ultimately found that if field preemption did not apply, the lack of such
preemptive force meant that neither would a finding of complete preemption.143
Thus, the preemption analyses between the cases are comparable and thus a
significant split exists.
The Third Circuit in Rosenberg began its preemption analysis very
differently from the Ninth in Miles. The Third Circuit first explained and
emphasized the overarching Supreme Court doctrine of the presumption against
preemption both generally and in bankruptcy cases:
In deciding whether Congress has occupied a field for exclusive
federal regulation, we begin, based on concerns of federalism, with a
sturdy ‘presumption against preemption.’ ‘This strong presumption
against inferring Congressional preemption also applies in the
bankruptcy context.’ It is overcome when ‘a Congressional purpose to
preempt … is clear and manifest.’144

With this foundation, the Third Circuit analyzed each of the text, structure,
and purpose of the Code.145 Similar to the analysis in Miles, the Rosenberg court
acknowledged that the Code is “silent as to potential remedies for non-debtors
harmed by an involuntary bankruptcy petition.”146 How the court interpreted this
silence is what differed from Miles:
This suggests that when Congress passed the provision it either did not
intend to disturb the existing framework of state law remedies for nondebtors or (more likely) was not thinking about non-debtor remedies
at all. In either case, field preemption does not apply.147

142
143
144
145
146
147

Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 421 n.4.
Id. at 419.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Here, the Third Circuit again quoted the Supreme Court, rationally refusing to
interpret congressional silence as a clear and manifest intention to “remove all
means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.”148
The court also found no field preemption with respect to structure and
purpose.149 The court looked to the “remedial purpose” of § 303(i), which it
believed to be essentially a balance of the inherent risks involved by “giving
creditors the ability to bring a debtor into bankruptcy.”150 The Third Circuit
found preempting state law remedies for non-debtors cuts directly against this
remedial purpose, especially in light of the almost guarantee of proximate or
derivative damage to third parties in these situations.151
The opinion pivoted its analysis to disposing of various counterarguments.
It specifically identified the public policy based uniformity concerns from Miles
in which the Ninth Circuit believed state laws would interfere with the federal
scheme.152 The Rosenberg court acknowledged that there likely will be conflicts
between federal regulation and state law, but they were willing to “‘rely on the
traditional comity between the two systems . . . .’ and trust that state courts
faithfully will account for federal bankruptcy law to the extent it may be relevant
to a state law claim against a creditor.”153 The Miles court acknowledged that
state courts can account for federal bankruptcy law in other areas, but does not
extend this trust to involuntary bankruptcy remedies like the Rosenberg court
does here.
The court concluded its analysis by specifically confronting the Miles
decision but does “not find Miles persuasive on the preemption issue” because:
Near the beginning of its analysis, the Miles Court admitted that the
‘Bankruptcy Code and its legislative history are silent on whether
Congress intended 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) to provide the exclusive basis
for awarding damages predicated upon the filing of an involuntary
bankruptcy petition.’ If we apply faithfully the presumption against
preemption, silence on the part of Congress should be the end of the
analysis. But the Court went on to ‘infer from Congress’s clear intent
to provide damage awards only to the debtor ... that Congress did not
intend [non-debtors] to be able to circumvent this rule by pursuing
those very claims in state court.’ Absent evidence that Congress
148
149
150
151
152
153

Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 420.
Id.
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actually meant for § 303(i) to be an exclusive remedy, we do not make
the same inference.154

Finally, the Third Circuit further distanced itself from the Miles decision by
reiterating that the Supreme Court “has never recognized complete preemption
in the Bankruptcy Code, and it seems the Ninth Circuit stands alone in this
regard.”155 Thus, the Third Circuit expressly held “that Bankruptcy Code
§ 303(i) does not preempt state law claims by non-debtors for damages based on
the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition.”156
B. The Recent Third Circuit Decision is Preferable to the Ninth Circuit
Precedent
The Third Circuit’s decision in Rosenberg takes a significant step towards
correcting the problem of non-debtor third parties lacking an avenue toward
recovery in these cases. The Rosenberg decision acknowledges that Congress
would likely not intend to foreclose any opportunity for non-debtors to pursue
damages for bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petitions.157 By ignoring the
presumption against preemption and relying almost entirely on uniformity
policy principles, the Ninth Circuit in Miles failed to consider the practical
consequences of involuntary bankruptcy petitions considered in Rosenberg.
This section argues that the Third Circuit decision is preferable to the Ninth
Circuit precedent for four reasons: (1) it is more consistent with the purpose of
§ 303(i); (2) it is more consistent with the modern trends in bankruptcy law; (3)
it correctly applies the presumption against preemption doctrine; and (4) it
encourages Congress to clearly manifest its intent.
1. More Consistent with Purpose of § 303(i)
As shown, an involuntary bankruptcy petition provides creditors with a path
to inflict potentially serious damage to debtors, and the damages provision in
§ 303(i) reflects how seriously Congress considered this tool and these risks. It
is counterintuitive to hold that Congress would recognize and plan for such
inherent risks in involuntary bankruptcy and provide comprehensive debtor
protection while simultaneously foreclosing any and all remedies for nondebtors. Additionally, the potential damages that non-debtor third parties could

154
155
156
157

Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 421–22.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 418.
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suffer from a bad faith involuntary bankruptcy proceeding are likely to be
significantly higher now than in 1977 when Congress last spoke on the matter,
which the Miles court relied on in support of preemption.158 The level of
interconnectivity and rapid information sharing in 2018 is exponentially greater
than in 1977,159 and as such third parties to both individuals and business are
more exposed than ever to the type of bad faith petition involved in these
situations.
If both the Third and Ninth Circuits are correct that non-debtors do not have
standing under § 303(i), it would be inequitable to foreclose all opportunities to
recover by these non-debtors and against what Congress would likely intend.
Thus, even though it is allowing non-debtors to seek remedies under state law
and not the Code, the Rosenberg court is still furthering the purpose of § 303(i)
by protecting those potentially suffering serious harm by the very tool that
Congress created.
A likely counterargument is the potential “floodgate of litigation” leading to
an overburdened court system.160 If non-debtors are suddenly permitted to sue
for bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petitions, the number of potential claimants
might increase dramatically. Additionally, if in fact the increased
interconnectivity of modern society has caused non-debtor damage to be both
more likely and widespread than it was in 1977, this number of potential
claimants and “flood” of litigation would be even worse. The court in Rosenberg
acknowledged these “fears of a flood of state court litigation challenging the
actions of creditors that would chill the use of involuntary bankruptcy
proceedings and permit state courts to rewrite bankruptcy law.”161
However, involuntary bankruptcies by definition are initiated by the
creditor, and there are a variety of reasons why the number of involuntary
bankruptcy filings remain so low.162 Increasing the potential damages a creditor
might face is only going to make it less likely that creditors use this tool, thus
counteracting any additional lawsuits brought by non-debtor third parties.

158
H.R.Rep. No. 95–595, at 324 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6280 (emphasis added);
S.Rep. No. 95–989, at 34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5820 (identical text).
159
Stanley Fawcett, Information Sharing and Supply Chain Performance: The Role of Connectivity and
Willingness, 12 SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT.: AN INT’L J. 358, 368 (2007).
160
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 489 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
In re Lawrence, 293 F.3d 615, 621 (2d Cir. 2002); Whitbeck v. Cook, 15 Johns. 482, 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818).
161
Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 420.
162
Block-Lieb, supra note 15, at 844-46 (including reasons such as preference for extrajudicial
alternatives, informational disadvantages, and the damages provisions in § 303(i)).
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Finally, under the Rosenberg decision, these lawsuits will be heard in state courts
throughout the U.S., not burdening the federal bankruptcy courts.
2. More Consistent with Modern Trends in Bankruptcy Law
As discussed, throughout the Bankruptcy Code there is tension between the
competing goals for creditors and debtors. As the focus has continued to shift
from creditor recovery of debts to debtor relief from the harassment of relentless
creditors,163 the involuntary bankruptcy provisions should be interpreted this
way as well. By holding that the Code both preempts state law actions while
simultaneously not providing standing to third parties, the Miles decision creates
inconsistency by moving in the other direction.
The exposure that non-debtor third parties have to the damage caused by bad
faith involuntary petitions is likely to continue to increase. The Rosenberg
decision recognized that non-debtors can suffer close to if not just as much harm
as the debtor.164 The Code provides extensive protection for debtors,165 and the
Rosenberg court identified that even if the Code does not yet extend to nondebtors, the courts should recognize this increasing opportunity for harm and not
foreclose on the opportunity for non-debtors under state law.166 Creditors have
numerous alternative methods for debt collection both in state courts and by
encouraging debtors to enter into voluntary bankruptcy.167 If they are going to
pursue the last resort that is involuntary bankruptcy then they should have to
consider the risk to non-debtors as well as debtors.
3. Presumption Against Preemption
As the Rosenberg court made clear, the presumption against preemption is
one of two foundational principles required by the Supreme Court in any
preemption analysis. The only way to overcome this presumption is if Congress’
intention is explicitly clear, and ambiguity should be interpreted in favor of
presumption.
The courts in both Miles and Rosenberg interpreted the language in § 303(i)
as ambiguous:
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Block-Lieb, supra note 15, at 807.
Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 420.
165
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362.
166
Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 420.
167
Block-Lieb, supra note 15, at 844-46 ( including reasons such as preference for extrajudicial
alternatives, informational disadvantages, and the damages provisions in § 303(i)).
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Miles: “The statute is ambiguous as to whether damages under § 303(i) can
be awarded only in favor of the debtor or in favor of other parties.”168
Rosenberg: “Starting with text, § 303(i) provides a remedy to the debtor, but
is silent as to potential remedies for non-debtors harmed by an involuntary
bankruptcy petition.”169
The Rosenberg court, however, correctly interpreted ambiguity to mean that
congressional intent is not clear and manifest.170 Neither the majority nor
concurrence in Miles followed or even acknowledged the very well established
presumption against preemption. By finding that non-debtors lack standing
under § 303(i), entirely excluding the presumption against preemption from their
analysis, and then finding that the most extreme level of preemption applies, the
Miles court too quickly and inappropriately concluded that complete preemption
applied in this case.
4. Getting Congress’ Attention & Separation of Powers
By interpreting congressional silence to mean that states have the
responsibility to assess certain damages related to a bankruptcy proceeding, the
Third Circuit’s ruling in Rosenberg encourages Congress to clarify its intent.
This is one of the primary reasons the presumption against preemption exists.171
If Congress’ intent is to foreclose state law opportunities for non-debtors, the
Third Circuit’s interpretation in Rosenberg forces Congress to clearly say so.
This is the appropriate role of the judiciary within the separation of powers
context as well.172
C. The Impact of Rosenberg
The obvious impact of the Rosenberg decision is the amplified risks to
creditors. As this Comment has shown, the chain reaction of damages resulting
from dismissed petitions could cast a wide net of potential claimants that is likely
to continue increasing in the future.173 This increased economic exposure is thus
likely to result in continued reduction of involuntary bankruptcy petitions.
Creditors, already exposed to substantial damages in favor of just the debtor,
will have to be even more careful when electing to use involuntary bankruptcy.
168
169
170
171
172
173

In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1093.
Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419.
Id.
Silkwood v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1216 (2015).
Fawcett, supra note 159.
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III. A PROPOSED INTERPRETATION
In summary, both circuit courts agree that § 303(i) does not provide standing
to non-debtors to pursue damages for bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petitions.
The courts split on whether the Code preempts state law action arising from
these same petitions, with the Ninth Circuit finding for complete preemption and
the Third finding no preemption. This section introduces a proposed,
comparatively hybrid interpretation that would read § 303(i) as providing
standing to non-debtors for bad faith involuntary bankruptcy proceedings
combined with the application of removal jurisdiction and ordinary preemption.
This proposal not only follows well-established statutory interpretation
doctrines, but also allows the courts to achieve the policy goals underlying both
the Miles and Rosenberg decisions. Similar to the prior analysis, this section
proceeds in three parts by analyzing this proposal with respect to (1) standing,
(2) preemption and removal, and (3) effects.
A. Standing
The argument that § 303(i) of the Code gives standing to non-debtors rests
on practical and policy arguments as well as three established textual canons of
statutory interpretation: (1) the presumption of intention when a statute includes
a word in one section but not another; (2) the plain meaning canon of
construction; and (3) the rule against surplusage.
As previously discussed, the Code permits the courts to grant judgment
“against the petitioners and in favor of the debtor” under § 303(i)(1)174 and only
“against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad faith”175 under § 303(i)(2).
The language expressly states that § 303(i)(1), awarding attorney’s fees and
costs, applies to the debtor only, but § 303(i)(2) does not include the express
language when awarding compensatory and punitive damages when the petition
is filed in bad faith.176 Unlike the holding in Miles and Rosenberg, policy
implications and Supreme Court statutory interpretation doctrines demonstrate
that this discrepancy should be interpreted to be intentional and providing
standing to non-debtors. This section next examines both the textual and nontextual arguments in favor of this interpretation.

174
175
176

11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2016) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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B. Textual Canons of Statutory Interpretation
The Supreme Court has clearly ruled on situations where statutes include
language in one section but not in others: “where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”177 Because Congress included the debtor
in § 303(i)(1) but not § 303(i)(2), the courts should presume that Congress did
so on purpose and that by not expressly limiting damages for bad faith
involuntary petitions to the debtor, non-debtors should be able to recover under
this section. Neither the Miles nor Rosenberg courts acknowledge this Supreme
Court canon.
Courts often use this presumption of intent with the plain meaning
construction,178 and this combination of the canons can also be seen within the
context of the Code. First, even within the same section, § 303(i)(2) includes the
words “bad faith” while § 303(i)(1) does not.179 However, § 303(i)(2) is clearly
understood to mean that punitive damages are only available if the court finds
the petition to be filed in bad faith.180 The court should interpret the single
inclusion of “debtor” in the same manner.
Another example of the combination of this presumption of intent and plain
meaning canon can be found in the interpretation of § 362(c) of the Code.181
Section 362 governs one of the most important aspects of bankruptcy and the
Code: the automatic stay.182 The automatic stay prevents creditors from
beginning or continuing any pursuit against the debtor once the bankruptcy
petition has begun. Section 362(c) provides for situations in which the automatic
stay is terminated.183 Section 362(c)(3) governs when a debtor files for
bankruptcy within one year of a dismissed bankruptcy petition.184 Subsection
(A) of § 362(c)(A) provides that the automatic stay for actions “taken with
respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to any lease shall

177
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citing United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720,
722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
178
See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
179
11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (2016).
180
Gonzales, 830 F.2d at 1036.
181
11 U.S.C. § 362 (2016).
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
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terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later
case.”185 However:
[t]he majority view is that the automatic stay terminates under
§ 362(c)(3)(A) only with regard to the debtor and property of the
debtor, not property of the estate.186 Many of these courts have relied
on the ‘plain language’ of § 362(c)(3)(A) in determining that the
automatic stay is not terminated in regard to property of the estate after
the 30–day period expires.187

Here, the courts have reasoned that by including “property of the estate” in
other Code provisions, but not in § 362(c)(3)(A), the plain language and
presumption of Congress’ intent in these situations dictate that the omission was
intentional.188 A bankruptcy judge has explained this “plain language” approach:
Section 362(c)(3)(A) as a whole is not free from ambiguity, but the
words, ‘with respect to the debtor’ in that section are entirely plain; a
plain reading of those words makes sense and is entirely consistent
with other provisions of § 362 and other sections of the Bankruptcy
Code. Section 362(c)(3)(A) provides that the stay terminates ‘with
respect to the debtor.’ How could that be any clearer?189

Thus, bankruptcy courts are not only familiar with using these canons when
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code but have held that they are the appropriate
manner in which to interpret the Code. A similar method should be used with
respect to § 303(i) and damages for bad faith involuntary filings. Even if § 303(i)
“as a whole is not free from ambiguity . . . a plain reading of those words makes
sense.”190
Outside of the bankruptcy context, the Supreme Court has been very clear
about the plain meaning canon of construction, stating that “the meaning of a
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is
framed, and if that is plain…the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.”191 When the language is plain, “the duty of interpretation

185

11 U.S.C. § 362 (2016); In re Stanford, 373 B.R. 890, 894–95 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2007).
See, e.g., In re Jumpp, 356 B.R. 789 (1st Cir. BAP 2006); In re Tubman, 364 B.R. 574 (Bankr. D. Md.
2007); In re McFeeley, 362 B.R. 121 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007); In re Hollingsworth, 359 B.R. 813 (Bankr. D. Utah
2006); In re Pope, 351 B.R. 14 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2006); In re Murray, 350 B.R. 408 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006).
187
In re Stanford, 373 B.R. at 895.
188
Id.
189
In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 363 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
190
Id.
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Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485.
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does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no
discussion.”192
By simply finding the omission to mean ambiguity, neither of the split courts
gave proper deference to this Supreme Court doctrine. The meaning of § 303(i)
can be interpreted plainly and clearly from the statute itself, and thus the courts
had no “duty of interpretation.” The courts’ inquisitions into the purpose and
dated legislative history of § 303(i) were unwarranted, and because Congress
limited § 303(i)(1) to the debtor but did not do so for § 303(i)(2), the courts
should interpret this to allow non-debtors to have standing.
The third applicable canon of construction is the rule against surplusage, a
“basic interpretive canon that a statute should be construed to give effect to all
its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.”193 While marginally overlapping with the prior two canons, by
reading § 303(i)(2) as excluding all but the debtor, the Court made Congress’
use of “in favor of the debtor” in § 303(i)(1) superfluous.194 This clearly violates
this basic interpretative canon and the provision should be interpreted as giving
standing to non-debtor third parties.
Overall, the few decisions ruling on these situations do not give proper
deference to Supreme Court textual canons of statutory interpretation. If
remedied, the courts should find that § 303(i)(2) does give standing to nondebtors to pursue damages for bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petitions.
C. Preemption & Removal Jurisdiction
Once a court finds that the omission of “debtor” in 303(i)(2) means that the
plain language of the statute can be interpreted to give non-debtors standing,
those non-debtor plaintiffs will be able to sue under the Code. However, if a
non-debtor plaintiff instead brings state law claims in state court, the court and
thus this Comment still must consider both preemption and removal jurisdiction.
While the Miles court goes too far in applying complete preemption, there are
legitimate reasons why both removal jurisdiction and ordinary preemption
should apply in these cases even when considering the strong presumption
against preemption, especially once non-debtor standing exists under
§ 303(i)(2).
192

Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485.
Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004))
(internal quotations omitted).
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11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1) (2016).
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Consequently, with respect to preemption and removal jurisdiction, this
proposed interpretation supports Judge Berzon’s concurrence in Miles.195 While
Judge Berzon agreed that § 303 did not grant standing to non-debtors, his
reasoning for removal and preemption is by far the most in line with precedent
and practical in its future application.
For removal jurisdiction purposes, the Ninth Circuit itself previously ruled
that:
Proceedings to recover damages under § 303(i) constitute cases under
title 11 for the purposes of § 1334, both because they depend on
bankruptcy law for their existence, and because they do not arise
unless an involuntary bankruptcy petition is dismissed by the
bankruptcy court.196

If § 303 does fall within the courts’ original and exclusive jurisdiction, which
this Comment argues that it does, “[s]tate courts are not authorized to determine
whether a person’s claim for relief under a federal law, in a federal court, and
within that court’s exclusive jurisdiction, is an appropriate one.”197 Even if the
claim is a state law cause of action, the relief sought still pertains solely to a
federal involuntary bankruptcy petition. Thus, “it is for Congress and the federal
courts, not the state courts, to decide what incentives and penalties are
appropriate for use in connection with the bankruptcy process.”198 The effect of
this reasoning is similar to that of complete preemption, but its application is
significantly less complicated and well understood across both federal and state
courts.199 It is interesting that the Ninth Circuit is one of two courts to explicitly
rule that § 303(i) proceedings satisfy the requirements for original and exclusive
jurisdiction and removal to federal court,200 yet still chose to apply complete
preemption when its own precedent would have achieved essentially the same
result. No court has declared § 303(i) to fall outside of the § 1334 original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
Rosenberg relied on the presumption against preemption because it found
that the Code is “silent as to potential remedies for non-debtors harmed by an
involuntary bankruptcy petition.”201 This argument still has merit. However,
§ 303(i)(2) should be interpreted not as silent, but instead as granting standing
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1095–96 (Berzon, J., concurring).
Johnson, supra note 76.
Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d at 1036.
Id.
Johnson, supra note 76.
Gonzales, 830 F.2d at 1035; Glannon v. Carpenter, 245 B.R. 882, 887 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2000).
Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 419.
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to non-debtors. Once non-debtors have standing under the Code, the Code
provides the exclusive remedy and the presumption against preemption no
longer applies just as it would not apply to the debtor for the same claim.202
D. Practical and Policy Implications
Giving non-debtors standing to pursue damages for bad faith involuntary
bankruptcy petitions can further several underlying practical and policy goals in
both Miles and Rosenberg. There are at least four such rationales: (1)
constitutional uniformity principles; (2) the purpose of § 303(i); (3) avoiding
complete preemption doctrine; and (4) encouraging Congress to clarify its intent.
1. Constitutional Uniformity Principles
In Miles, the court seemed to reach its conclusion based primarily on
uniformity concerns:
[T]he need for uniformity in the administration of the bankruptcy laws
persuaded the Framers to expressly grant Congress the power ‘to
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout
the United States.’ Art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Permitting state courts to decide
whether the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition was
appropriate would subvert the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts and undermine uniformity in bankruptcy law by allowing state
courts to create their own standards as to when a creditor may properly
file an involuntary petition.203

This is a legitimate line of reasoning. The Rosenberg court casually brushed
this argument aside by relying on the “traditional comity” between the state and
federal systems.204 However, it is important to remember that this situation only
involves bad faith petitions, and as discussed above, the standards for
determining bad faith with respect to involuntary petitions are themselves
anything but uniform.205 This interpretation prevents the already “dizzying array
of standards” from being multiplied across fifty unique state jurisdictions.206
Furthermore, this potential extrapolation of bad faith standards still does not

202
Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Congress’ authorization of certain sanctions
for the filing of frivolous bankruptcy petitions should be read as an implicit rejection of other penalties, including
the kind of substantial damage awards that might be available in state court tort suits.”).
203
In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1090.
204
Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 421.
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In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 804 F.3d at 335.
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even include the wide variety of additional state law actions to be litigated and
adjudicated once bad faith is determined.
For example, in Miles the plaintiff asserted claims of defamation, false light,
abuse of process, emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, and simple
negligence,207 each of which have their own standards across the fifty states. In
Rosenberg the plaintiff only filed a “single claim of tortious interference.”208 It
is unlikely that this difference from Miles was determinative to the final holding,
but it is a significant difference between the plaintiffs’ assertions in state court.
This disparity could have influenced the Rosenberg court to give more weight
to uniformity principles than in Miles.
Moreover, while it is difficult to have any sympathy for a creditor filing an
involuntary bankruptcy petition in bad faith, this potentially vast number of bad
faith standards and unknown types of state law claims makes it extremely
difficult for creditors to know if their petition will be considered bad faith.
Congress has committed to keeping involuntary bankruptcy in the Code despite
its infrequent utilization,209 and such a potentially broad, and increased,
economic exposure to creditors might curb its use altogether or lead to
significant forum shopping and other conflict of law issues. Overall, interpreting
§ 303(i) as allowing non-debtors a path to recovery is likely to accomplish the
primary goal of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Miles of encouraging “uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”210
2. The Purpose of § 303(i)
If uniformity is the primary goal of the Miles court, the purpose of § 303(i)
is likewise the principal policy objective underlying the Third Circuit’s ruling in
Rosenberg. Similarly, as this hybrid interpretation achieved the uniformity
goals, it also preserved the remedial purpose of § 303(i). As discussed, § 303(i)
serves dual purposes. First, debtors and non-debtors are at risk for serious harm
from unwarranted involuntary bankruptcy filings,211 especially in light of
increasing interconnectivity and rapid information sharing. Second, allowing the
court to apply such strict, even punitive, damages serves as a deterrence to
creditors contemplating the use of a bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petition as
a collection tool:
207
208
209
210
211

In re Miles, 430 F.3d at 1086.
Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 417.
Block-Lieb, supra note 15.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
In re SBA Factors of Miami, Inc., 13 B.R. at 101.
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The purpose of punitive damages is to deter similar acts in the future,
both by the petitioning creditors and to serve as an example for others
in similar circumstances [a] second purpose for punitive damages is to
punish the petitioning creditors for wrongdoing in filing the petition in
bad faith.212

This proposed interpretation furthers both of these objectives. As the court
argued in Rosenberg, it is unlikely that Congress would affirmatively and
intentionally foreclose all opportunities for non-debtors in these situations.213
Combined with the fact that non-debtors are increasingly susceptible to harm in
modern society, this interpretation serves the remedial purpose of protecting
those exposed to malicious creditor activity.
Second, including non-debtors in the scope of creditor liability will only
further the deterrence scheme underlying the award of compensatory and
punitive damages under § 303(i). When considering their decision to file,
creditors must be even more careful to avoid doing so in a manner constituting
bad faith. An additional advantage is that it will also further protection for
debtors themselves under § 303(i)(2) if creditors are less likely to file a petition
in bad faith as a collection tactic. Debtor protection remains one of the most
important goals of the modern Code and bankruptcy system,214 and it is intuitive
that the Code would also protect third parties suffering from intentionally
harmful creditor collection methods.215
While a more structural or textual analysis, it is important to emphasize the
way in which Congress’ purpose is evident if non-debtors are given standing
under § 303(i)(2). Under this interpretation, non-debtors can still only pursue
damages for bad faith involuntary petitions. While debtors can collect attorney’s
fees and costs for any dismissed involuntary bankruptcy petition, petitions filed
by creditors who demonstrate more malevolence than simply being incorrect that
a debtor is failing to pay its debts. In these situations, it is intuitive that a creditor
should be liable for all damage proximately caused by the petition.
3. Avoiding Complete Preemption
The complete preemption doctrine has only been applied by the Supreme
Court within the context of three statutes, none of which include the Bankruptcy

212
213
214
215

In re Johnston Hawks, Ltd., 72 B.R. 361, 367 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1987).
Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 417.
In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., L.L.C., 298 B.R. at 605.
Id.
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Code.216 The Ninth Circuit in Miles is the first and only circuit to apply the
doctrine within the bankruptcy context.217 Even if the Miles court correctly
interpreted § 303(i)(2) to preempt any state law action for non-debtors against
creditors who file a bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petition, it unnecessarily
extended the complete preemption doctrine to this case.
The confusing complete preemption doctrine can be entirely avoided if the
courts interpret § 303(i)(2) as granting standing to non-debtors, removal
jurisdiction is appropriate, and ordinary preemption applies. Because complete
preemption is so unclear and controversial it has invited academic analyses
highlighting its inconsistency and the difficulty in expanding to areas beyond
the specific situations where the Supreme Court has already done so.218
Unsurprisingly, a variety of concerns have been identified in expanding
complete preemption without further explanation from the Supreme Court.
These include chiefly that the doctrine still lacks a clear rule or guideline for
application outside of the LMRA, ERISA, and NBA contexts.219 The Supreme
Court’s decisions applying complete preemption lack a “coherent framework of
principles and rules”220 and the tests are “unworkable” and “capable of
producing opposite results.”221 Finally, this confusion has led to “only a handful”
of lower court cases extending the complete preemption doctrine, further
stymieing its development.222
When combining the inconsistent doctrine with the uniformity concerns,
expanding the complete preemption doctrine in the bankruptcy context would
undermine the uniformity of the bankruptcy system, and removal jurisdiction of
the statute is more appropriate and less inconsistent:
Uniformity of the law should and can be instead accomplished by
removing cases within the original jurisdiction under the general
removal statute. Such removal does not deprive the states of their
power to act since only cases already within the federal jurisdiction
can be removed. Removal of claims within the original jurisdiction of

216
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968); Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58
(1987); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003).
217
Rosenberg, 835 F.3d at 422.
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Johnson, supra note 76.
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REV. 363, 371 (1998).
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the bankruptcy courts also results in the desired uniformity of the
bankruptcy law.223

Finally, in relation to the purpose of § 303(i) and more generally the Code,
federalism principles require that there be limitations on federal law and
deference be given to states.224 Because bankruptcy and state law overlap to such
an extent, when the Code does not expressly provide a solution to a situation the
courts must defer to state law.225 While this Comment argues that, in this case,
there is such express statutory support for non-debtor standing, removal to
bankruptcy court, and preemption of state law claims, it is a risky and potentially
slippery slope proposition to achieve the result by applying complete preemption
to the Code. Once a court finds that the Code completely preempts state law in
the context of § 303, complete preemption might then be easily extended to
additional Code sections and thus upset the delicate balance between federal and
state law that exists in the bankruptcy context.
4. Encourages Congress to Clarify its Intent
The Supreme Court has stated that the test for the complete preemption
doctrine is primarily based on congressional intent.226 Like in Rosenberg, this
interpretation also encourages Congress to clarify its intent without inferring it
for them but still providing non-debtors a path to a remedy in the meantime.
Because § 303 would now provide standing for non-debtors, if Congress did in
fact want to bar them from an avenue towards recovery, it would be forced to do
so expressly. This again prevents courts from legislating as a judiciary.
E.

Impact of Proposed Interpretation

The impact of this proposed interpretation would be similar to the impact
from Rosenberg, with an increasing number of non-debtor claims and a
corresponding further decrease in involuntary bankruptcy petitions. However,
and distinct from the impact of the Rosenberg decision, limiting the claims to
federal court and § 303 should lead to a more efficient and expedient
development of standards and predictable results around which parties can
negotiate outside of the court system, a result likely favored by all parties
involved.227 Furthermore, because so few courts have had to address these issues
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of fact and law,228 there is little chance of a gate behind which a flood of nondebtors are waiting for § 303 standing before bringing their claim.229
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this nuanced and sparsely litigated area of law warrants
further analysis by both Congress and the courts. As long as Congress continues
its support of the involuntary bankruptcy process, despite its decline in use, those
harmed by its abuse deserve a clear answer to their options for recovery.
This issue is one of continually competing principles and objectives: creditor
versus debtor bankruptcy goals; federal versus state federalism interests of both
law and forum; textual versus intent statutory interpretative methods; and
constitutional uniformity versus the remedial purpose of bankruptcy law. While
the Ninth Circuit in Miles favored federal law and constitutional uniformity in
bankruptcy law, the Third Circuit in Rosenberg deferred to state law and the
remedial purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. If forced to choose, the author would
rather sacrifice uniformity before foreclosing non-debtors “remov[ing] all
means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.”230 As such, the
recent Third Circuit decision creating the circuit split is preferable.
Lastly, a hybrid approach would instead confer Code standing to non-debtor
third parties harmed by bad faith involuntary bankruptcy petitions, while
reaffirming established preemption removal jurisdiction doctrines. This
interpretation offers a path that reconciles bankruptcy uniformity and purpose
principles while protecting those taking collateral damage.
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